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I. Introduction
A. Oklahoma Economy: The SCOOP & STACK
The State of Oklahoma has a rich history of oil and gas development along
with an economy that has become highly dependent on oil and gas operations
within the state. According to the Oklahoma Energy Resource Board
(“OERB”), Oklahoma is the fourth-largest producer of crude oil and the
third-largest producer of natural gas in the country.1 Historically, some of the
most sought-after oil and gas drilling and production locations in the country
have been found in Oklahoma.2 The “highly developed” infrastructure of the
industry in the southern states has significantly contributed to Oklahoma’s
superior development in the natural resource industry.3 In reference to
Oklahoma oil fields, oil and gas analyst Jason Carnovale of the Freedonia
Group said, “[n]ot only do they possess strong individual wells, initial
production (“IP”) rates and competitive drilling costs, these oil fields feature
stacked formations.”4
Along with Oklahoma’s advantageous infrastructural position, the state is
home to the South Central Oklahoma Oil Province (“SCOOP”) and the

1. Scoop & Stack: Breaking Down the Economic Impact of O&NG Reserves, ENERGY
HQ: POWERED BY THE OKLAHOMA ENERGY RESOURCE BOARD, https://energyhq.com/
2018/06/scoop-stack-breaking-down-the-economic-impact-of-ong-reserves/ (last visited Jan.
22, 2019).
2. Daniel Debelius, Layer Cakes: The Geology of Oklahoma’s SCOOP and STACK,
FREEDONIA (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.freedoniagroup.com/Content/Blog/2017/08/10/
Layer-Cakes--The-Geology-of-Oklahomas-SCOOP-and-STACK.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Sooner Trend Anadarko Canadian Kingfisher (“STACK”) shale plays.5 The
SCOOP, in particular, includes parts of Caddo, Grady, Comanche, Stephens,
McClain, Carter, Love, Murray and Garvin counties.6 The SCOOP,
importantly, overlaps with the geological province under scrutiny in the
Meier v. Chesapeake case—the Arbuckle Uplift.7 The SCOOP and STACK
plays are layered with multiple dense formations, including the Woodford
Shale formation which is known for its high yields of oil and condensate.8
B. Underground Injection Wells
The Federal Safe Water Drinking Act (“SWDA”) of 1974 protects the
public by regulating the quality of drinking water.9 Pursuant to the Act, a
program was enacted to regulate underground sources of public drinking
water.10 Under the program, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
sets out minimum requirements for state underground injection control
(“UIC”) programs.11 Oklahoma’s UIC program was approved by the EPA in
1981, granting the state authority over the entire state, except for the Osage
Indian Reserve.12 The Oklahoma Corporation Commission (“OCC”) is
vested with control over Class II wells under 52 O.S. 2011 § 139(B)(1)(f).13
Since 1981, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission has held primacy for
approval and regulation of underground injection wells.14 Particularly, within
the OCC’s jurisdiction are Class II wells under the Federal Underground
Injection Control Program.15 Class II wells consist of disposal wells,
enhanced recovery wells, and hydrocarbon storage wells.16
5. See Maps: Oil and Gas Exploration, Resources, and Production, U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, https://www.eia.gov/maps/maps.htm (last visited Jan. 22,
2019).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Matt Menchaca, Oklahoma Oil and Gas: Woodford SCOOP Wells Have Stamina,
DRILLING INFO (Jan. 14, 2014), https://info.drillinginfo.com/oklahoma-oil-and-gas-woodfordscoop-wells-stamina/. See also Bob Black, Exactly What is Condensate and Why is its Export
Prohibited?, DRILLING INFO (Jan. 6, 2015), https://info.drillinginfo.com/what-exactly-iscondensate/ (providing background information on condensate).
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f, et seq. (West 2016).
10. Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC, 248 F.Supp. 3d 1194, 1200 (W.D. Okla.
2017).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52 §139(B)(1)(f) (2011).
16. EPA Underground Injection Control Program, 40 C.F.R § 144.6 (West 2011).
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Operators most commonly use disposal wells to dispose of wastewater
generated from production and hydraulic fracturing.17 Hydraulic fracturing is
a method used to create new pathways in a formation for hydrocarbons to
flow.18 This method permanently changes the formation’s geology.19 Water
from both production and hydraulic fracturing have high levels of brine from
ancient formations and other materials that cannot be allowed to mix with the
ground or drinking water.20 Operators often inject wastewater into the
depleted wellbores of formations that previously held oil and gas, using them
as disposal wells.21
Contrary to popular belief, approximately ninety-five percent of the
wastewater injected into disposal wells is produced water—formation water
that is extracted along with oil and gas—not flowback fluid.22 “Flowback
fluid” refers to the fluid that flows back up the wellbore after hydraulic
fractionation stages are complete.23 This fluid often contains brine,
chemicals, and sometimes naturally occurring radioactive material.24
Flowback tends to be highly toxic and is often disposed of by injection into
underground disposal wells along with produced waters.25 Recovery of
hydraulic fracturing water from a reservoir is, in most cases, less than fifty
percent.26
C. The Arbuckle Uplift and Seismicity
The Arbuckle Uplift is a geological province that lies under a large portion
of Oklahoma.27 The formation has high porosity and is, therefore, commonly

17. Monika U. Ehrman, Earthquakes in the Oilpatch: The Regulatory Legal Issues
Arising out of Oil and Gas Operation Induced Seismicity, 33 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 609, 626–
27 (2017).
18. Monika U. Ehrman, The Next Great Compromise: A Comprehensive Response to
Opposition Against Shale Gas Development Using Hydraulic Fracturing in the United States,
46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 423 (2014).
19. Id.
20. Ehrman, supra note 17.
21. Id. at 627.
22. Seth Whitehead, Oklahoma Earthquakes Have Decreased Rapidly Since 2015,
UNITED STATE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (APRIL 6, 2018), https://www.energyindepth.org/
oklahoma-earthquake-declines-continue-first-quarter-2018/.
23. Ehrman, supra note 18, at 433–34.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Joe Wertz, A Popular but Poorly Understood Oklahoma Rock Layer is Keeping
Earthquake Secrets, STATE IMPACT: OKLAHOMA, https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/
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used for wastewater disposal because it can absorb large amounts of water.28
In 2014, Oklahoma was considered the most seismically active state—even
more so than California.29 During 2015–2017, the OCC issued several
directives and reduction plans to reduce the amount of wastewater disposed
into the Arbuckle formation due to concerns about induced seismicity.30 The
OCC, as part of its 2015 response, ordered 92 operators of 347 disposal wells
to proffer proof that no granite “basement rock” was being disturbed by their
wells.31
Issues of man-induced seismicity are often found where disposal wells are
drilled too deeply into basement rock.32 Seismicity has much to do with the
underlying fault lines of the area.33 In Oklahoma, for example, the plates are
“squeezing the region from east to west, which results in most earthquakes
occurring along a northwest-southwest fault.”34 Faults are located in
basement rock.35 Ancient basement rock tends to fracture along major faults
under duress.36 So, “[t]he deeper you inject, the more likely it is that the
injected brine is going to make its way into seismogenic fault zone, prone to
producing earthquakes.”37
Ultimately, the location of the disposal wells in conjunction with the
relative fault scheme of the area, creates the propensity for injection to cause
earthquakes. Consequently, the majority of Oklahoma’s disposal wells are
not likely to induce earthquakes—only those drilled too deeply into the
basement rock.38 Importantly, since the introduction of the 2015 mandates,
induced seismic activity in Oklahoma has seen a rapid decline.39 In fact, the

2015/11/30/a-popular-but-poorly-understood-oklahoma-rock-layer-is-keeping-earthquakesecrets/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2018).
28. Ehrman, supra note 17.
29. Earthquakes, STATE IMPACT: OKLAHOMA, https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/tag/
earthquakes/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
30. Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC, 248 F. Supp.3d 1194, 1202 (W.D. Okla.
2017). The OCC’s response to seismic activity in the formation began as early as 2013.
31. STATE IMPACT: OKLAHOMA, supra note 29.
32. Ariane Wu, Are We Causing Earthquakes in Oklahoma? (Aug. 17, 2015),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-08-17/are-we-causing-earthquakes-oklahoma.
33. Ehrman, supra note 17.
34. Id. (citation omitted).
35. Wu, supra note 32.
36. Ehrman, supra note 17.
37. Id. at 627–28 (citation omitted).
38. Whitehead, supra note 22.
39. Id.
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average daily felt earthquake count for the first few months of 2018 was
seventy-nine percent lower than that of 2015.40
Some blame hydraulic fracturing, in part, for induced seismicity. 41
However, it has been generally accepted that hydraulic fracturing activities
rarely—if at all—cause earthquakes within the United States.42 In light of
same, the regulatory scheme imposed to regulate injection wells, the Safe
Water Drinking Act, specifically omits hydraulic fracturing activity from the
regulatory scheme, unless there is injection with diesel.43 The Safe Water
Drinking Act specifically excludes “the underground injection of fluids or
propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing
operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities[,]” from its
definition of “underground injection.”44
II. Law before the case
A. Jurisdiction
The question before the court in Meier v. Chesapeake Operating was one
of first impression for Oklahoma courts. Therefore, it was appropriate that
the district court, sitting in diversity, review whether or not the Property
Owners should be allowed to recover insurance premiums, in the absence of
Oklahoma substantive law, based off of how the court predicted the
Oklahoma Supreme Court would rule on the matter.45 The court, in making
the prediction, was “free to consider all resources available, including
decision of [Oklahoma] courts, other state courts and federal courts, in
addition to the general weight and trend of authority.”46
B. Recovery of Insurance Premiums
Insurance premiums have sometimes been awarded as damages in civil
suits. In Seifts v. Consumer Health Solutions LLC, participants in a health
insurance plan were awarded insurance premiums paid as recovery for a
40. Id.
41. Ker Than, Oklahoma Earthquakes Linked to Oil and Gas Wastewater Disposal Wells,
Say Stanford Researchers, STANFORD UNIVERSITY NEWS (June 18, 2015),
https://news.stanford.edu/2015/06/18/okla-quake-drilling-061815/.
42. See Id.
43. The Federal Safe Water Drinking Act (“SWDA”), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h(d)(1)(B) (West
2016).
44. Id.
45. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); F.D.I.C. v. Schuchmann, 235 F.3d 1217
(10th Cir. 2000).
46. Schuchmann, 235 F.3d at 1225.
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breach of contract suit.47 Similarly, in Washington Life Insurance Co. v.
Lovejoy, insured recovered insurance premiums paid after insurance
company breached contract.48 Also, in Mills v. Dailey, a divorcee was
allowed to recover certain insurance premiums paid from the father of her
children.49 In Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd. P’ship, the court was
unwilling to award punitive-style tort damages for breach of contract but did
allow for the recovery of the cost to purchase insurance.50 Further, in Awuah
v. Coverall North American Inc., insurance premium recovery was statutorily
enforced.51 Finally, in Claudet v. Weyrich, the future cost of insurance
premiums to be paid were awarded for medical malpractice.52
However, in Severn Place Associates v. American Building Services, Inc.,
increased insurance premiums allegedly arising from tortfeasor’s negligence
were not awarded because the suing party could not show the conduct was
the cause of the injury in question.53 On appeal, the appellate court further
rationalized the premiums could not be awarded as a policy matter and the
damages were “too remote.”54 Similarly, in Nikolaus v. City of Baton Rouge,
insurance premiums were not awarded under the Severn Place55 ruling, based
on a lack of cause of action for recovery under theories of strict liability or
negligence.56
C. Oil and Gas Operations
In Oklahoma and under federal law, landowners generally have recourse
against oil and gas operators for their harmful activities or presence on leased
property in the form of either tort or environmental claims. 57 Claims may take
the form of nuisance, negligence, trespass, constructive fraud, unjust
enrichment, and breach of contract.58 Meritorious claims may allow for
recovery of damages for permanent and temporary injury to real property;
47. 61 F.Supp.3d 306, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
48. 149 S.W. 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
49. 38 So. 3d 731 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018).
50. 749 N.E. 2d 196 (N.Y. 2001).
51. 952 N.E.2d 890, 900 (Mass. 2011).
52. 662 So.2d 131, 132 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
53. 930 So. 2d 125, 129 (La. App. 2006).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 40 So. 3d 1244, 1248 (La. App. 2010).
57. Roger Meiners and Bruce Yandle, The Common Law: How it Protects the
Environment (May 1, 1998), https://www.perc.org/1998/05/01/the-common-law-how-itprotects-the-environment/).
58. Id.
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injury to personal property; injury to person; lost rents or profits; annoyances,
inconveniences, discomfort and loss of enjoyment; costs of investigation and
remediation; punitive damages; injunction; abatement; and attorney’s fees
and costs.59 When pursued in the environmental claim context, claims often
arise under the Safe Drinking Water Act, National Environmental Policy Act,
Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, or UIC regulatory violations.60
Seismicity induced by oil and gas operations has caused a unique strain of
litigation. Anthropogenic seismicity, unlike naturally occurring seismicity, is
not considered an “Act of God” because it involves human interference.61
Acts of God are often exempted from liability due to lack of foreseeability or
based on force majeure clauses in contracts.62 Generally, strict liability as a
cause of action has been rejected for oil and gas operations.63
In general-tort actions, plaintiffs often face the impossible obstacle of
proving what event caused the alleged damage and what company was
specifically responsible for the harmful event.64 Further, restraints from the
Federal Rules of Evidence and disallowance of speculative evidence under
Shell Oil Co. v. Haunchild65 make establishing legal liability to a particular
party extremely difficult without experts and at least circumstantial
evidence.66 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of
an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the
witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the
witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702.67
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
59. Id.
60. SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300f, et seq.; NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; CAA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401 et seq.; CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq.
61. Ehrman, supra note 17, at 645–46 (citation omitted).
62. See R.R. Co. v. Reeves, 77 U.S. 176 (1869) and Golsen v. ONG Western, INC., 1988
OK 26, 756 P.2d 1209.
63. See Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936) and Doddy v. OXY USA,
INC., 101 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 1996).
64. See Ehrman, supra note 17, at 645–46.
65. 1950 OK 250, 223 P.2d 333.
66. FED. R. EVID. 701. Opinion Testimony by Law Witness and FED. R. EVID. 702.
Testimony by Expert Witnesses.
67. FED. R. EVID. 701. Opinion Testimony by Law Witness.
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opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.68
Though the OCC has primacy and jurisdiction in regulating oil and gas
operations, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the OCC powers do
not extend to many litigious matters.69 The court, in Ladra v. New Dominion
LLC et al., ruled that OCC’s jurisdiction was “limited to the resolution of
public rights, and it lacks jurisdiction over disputes between two or more
private persons or entities not involving public rights.”70
III. Statement of the case
A. Facts
Oklahoma property owners Matt Meier, Sheryl Meier, and Kai Bach
(“Property Owners”) brought suit in state court in Payne County in 2017, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.71 Defendants to the action
included: Chesapeake Operating L.L.C.; Devon Energy Production
Company, LP; Midstates Petroleum Company LLC; New Dominion, LLC;
Range Production Company, LLC; Special Energy Corporation; and White
Star Petroleum, (“Operators”) who were considered by the Plaintiffs to be
“some of the largest operators of wastewater injection wells in the Arbuckle
formation.”72 Property Owners brought suit to recover alleged damages
resulting from insurance premiums paid to obtain earthquake insurance.73
Property Owners believed that Operators’ use of wastewater injection
wells drilled into the Arbuckle formation had caused thousands of man-made
earthquakes throughout the state since 2008.74 Property owners claimed that
they and those in similar positions, had been forced to acquire earthquake

68.
69.
70.
71.
2018).
72.
73.
74.

FED. R. EVID. 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses.
Ladra v. New Dominion LLC et al., 2015 OK 5 ¶ 10, 353 P.3d 529.
Id.
Meier v. Chesapeake Operating L.L.C., 324 F.Supp.3d 1207 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 13,
Id.
Id.
Id.
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insurance to protect their property and themselves from financial distress.75
Property Owners also alleged the increased seismic activity had caused
insurance premium prices to skyrocket.76
Property Owners brought suit under theories of public and private
nuisance, strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities, and negligence.77
Damages sought included: punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and
recoup of costs for acquiring and maintaining earthquake insurance coverage
since 2009.78
B. Procedural History
Operator Devon Energy removed the Property Owners’ action to federal
court, in accordance with the Class Action Fairness Act.79 All Operators then
moved to dismiss Property Owners’ complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.80 Operator Midstates also sought to dismiss
the complaint and strike all prepetition date claims due to the company’s
bankruptcy case.81 Further, Operator Chesapeake sought to dismiss the
complaint for a lack of ripeness of claims.82 The main issue before the Meier
court was whether or not a party may recover, as damages in a tort action,
the money paid toward insurance premiums to protect against future events.83
C. Holding
The Western District Court held that Property Owners were not entitled
to recover for any of the damages sought in their pleading.84 Additionally,
the court granted Operators’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the Property
Owners had not plead to be entitled to any appropriate relief.85 Further,
Property Owners’ class action petition was dismissed with prejudice.86

75. Id.
76. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d 1207.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.; The Class Action Fairness Act 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d) (West 2011).
80. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
81. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d 1207 (Federal bankruptcy court order barred collection on
claims arising before Midstates’ bankruptcy petition).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1220.
85. Id.
86. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1220.
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IV. Decision
The Western District Court decided the Property Owners lacked an
appropriate cause of action to recoup damages for the insurance premiums. 87
The court recognized the claim was one of first impression for Oklahoma and
relied upon its duty to predict whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court would
find the suggested relief “legally cognizable” as the basis for its authority on
the matter.88 The court rejected the Property Owners’ case law allowing for
recovery of insurance premiums as damages, distinguishing the proffered
cases as allowing recovery on different basis—contractual, statutory, or other
tort theory.89 The court, instead, adopted the view taken by the Operators’
authority which, opined that “no right of action exists for recovery of
insurance premiums based on a tortfeasor’s negligence or strict liability.”90
A. Jurisdictional Issues and Midstates’ Bankruptcy Case
Midstates filed for voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief in April of
2016.91 On October 21, 2016, the Chapter 11 repayment plan was confirmed,
discharging all claims against Midstates arising prior to the confirmation
date.92 Midstates argued that due to its bankruptcy discharge, Property
Owner’s claims arising before the confirmation date were barred as a
jurisdictional issue and as a matter of bankruptcy law.93 Bankruptcy courts
are generally charged with jurisdiction over all bankruptcy proceedings.94
The court agreed with Midstates, barring any consideration of operations
prior to the discharge date, dismissing Property Owners’ claims to the extent
that activities arose prior to October 21, 2016.95 The court did not, however,
on bankruptcy grounds, dismiss any claims arising after the confirmation

87. Id.
88. Id. at 1215.
89. Id. See also Interkal, Inc. v. UIS, Inc., 132 F.3d 33 (6th Cir. 1997); Seifts v. Consumer
Health Sol. LLC, 61 F.Supp.3d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd.
P’ship, 268 A.D.2d 121, 706 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dept. 2000); Supreme Lodge Knights of
Pythias v. Neeley, 135 1046 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc, 460 Mass.
484, N.E.2d. 890 (2011); Bos. Children’s Heart Found., Inc. v. Nadal-Ginard, 1994 WL
16011252 (D. Mass. 1994); Claudet v. Weyrich, 662 So.2d 131 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
90. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1216 (quoting Nikolaus v. City of Baton Rouge, 40 So.3d
1244, 1248 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2010)).
91. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1210.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West 2018).
95. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1211.
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date.96 The court reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code did not preclude the
court from deciding disputes arising post-discharge and therefore, the court
could consider the merits of the Property Owners’ claims for the postdischarge claims.97
B. Motions to Dismiss
Chesapeake Operating L.L.C. sought to dismiss Property Owners’
complaint based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of
standing and lack of ripeness of claims.98 The court explained that for Article
III standing the Property Owners were charged with proving that (1) they
suffered an injury in fact; (2) that the injury was fairly traceable to the action
of the Operators; and (3) that it was likely the injury would be redressed by
a favorable decision.99 The court concluded that, against the Operator’s
objection, the complaint was sufficient to establish Article III standing.100
The court explained the injury in fact prong was satisfied because it could
“reasonably infer” the Property Owners would have used their money
differently had they not been compelled to purchase the earthquake
insurance.101 Further, the court explained the second causation prong was
satisfied because the Property Owners’ complaint sufficiently established
their economic injury was not “solely attributable” to their own conduct.102
Finally, the court explained the final prong of redressability was satisfied
because the relief sought would redress the alleged injury, regardless of
whether or not the relief was proper.103
The court further denied Operator’s challenge to Property Owners’ claim
ripeness.104 The court explained that because Property Owners’ claim did not
rest on uncertain or contingent future events, the claim was ripe for
adjudication.105 All Operators challenged the sufficiency of Property
Owners’ complaint.106 The court ultimately granted the motion to dismiss
96. Id. at 1211–1212.
97. Id.
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d
at 1212.
99. .Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1212 (citing Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1144
(10th Cir. 2013)).
100. Id. at 1213–1214.
101. Id. at 1213.
102. Id. at 1213–1214.
103. Id. at 1214.
104. Id. at 1214.
105. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1214.
106. Id. at 1214–1215.
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under 12(b)(6) upon concluding the Property Owners were not entitled to any
of the relief set out for recovery in their pleadings.107
C. Substantive Issues and Loss of Chance Doctrine
The court noted that though the Loss of Chance Doctrine had been adopted
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the higher court had only done so in a
limited medical malpractice scope.108 The configuration for the doctrine did
not include insurance premiums.109 The Loss of Chance Doctrine, as relied
upon by Property Owners, is described by professor David A. Fischer:
This [proportional risk recovery] awards a reduced recovery to
any person exposed to a risk of future harm that has not yet come
to pass. Not all of these persons will actually suffer harm, but each
has suffered a loss in an actuarial sense because his chances of
avoiding the harm have been reduced. These kinds of losses can
often be insured against, and plaintiffs that use their recoveries to
purchase such insurance are not overcompensated. Those
plaintiffs that actually suffer the future loss will receive
appropriate compensation from their insurance companies. Those
plaintiffs that do not suffer the future loss receive nothing from
their insurance companies, and thus are not overcompensated.110
The court also rejected the Property Owners’ contention that recovery was
appropriate under Article 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution—“[t]he courts of
justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy and certain
remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or
reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial,
delay, or prejudice[,]”111—as well as Title 23 of the Oklahoma Statutes.112
The sections of Title 23 at issue were §§ 3—“[a]ny person who suffers
detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another, may recover from
the person in fault a compensation therefore in money, which is called
damages[,]”—and 61— “[f]or the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly
107. Id. at 1220.
108. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1217-1218. See McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., 1987 OK
69, 741 P.2d 467.
109. Id.
110. David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605,
633 (2001).
111. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
112. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1218–1219 (citation omitted).
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provided by this Chapter 1, is the amount which will compensate for all
detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated
or not.”113 The court cited precedent directly from the Western District that
did not allow recovery, based off of the constitutional or statute provisions,
for medical monitoring expenses.114
Further, the court relied on the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s interpretation
of Article 2, citing that Section 6 was intended “to guarantee that the judiciary
would be open and available for the resolution of disputes, but not to
guarantee that any particular set of events would result in court-awarded
relief.”115 In consideration of Property Owners’ Title 23 argument, the court
relied on the common law for which the statutes codified.116 The cases did
not recognize recovery of insurance premiums.117
D. Oklahoma Tort Law
The court then turned to Oklahoma tort law to determine whether the loss
of the Property Owners’ should be passed on to the Operators under tort
theory. The court listed several factors for consideration for a cause of action:
(1) the severity of the risk of loss; (2) the nature of the activity causing the
loss; and (3) whether the loss was sufficiently distinct from the general
vicissitudes of life.118 The court further explained the “vicissitudes of life
unavoidably present risks of harm which, equally unavoidably, vary in terms
of severity and actual impact on any particular individual.”119
The court opined that materialization of risk in the form of “tangible
harm,” such as personal injury or property damage, was a prerequisite to a
cause of action.120 The court further explained that the “limitation simply
recognizes the fact that life abounds with events and phenomena by which a
generalized risk faced by one person is increased in some way by the
activities of another.”121

113. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 3 (2018) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 61 (2018), respectively.
114. McCormick v. Halliburton, 895 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1156–1157 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
115. City of Anadarko v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 118, 1997 OK 14, ¶ 6, 934 P.2d
328, 330 (quotation omitted).
116. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1219. See WRG Constr. Co. v. Hoebel, 1979 OK 125, 600
P.2d 334 and Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Secs, Inc., 2007 OK CIV APP 8,
152 P.3d 897.
117. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1219.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1219.
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E. No Materialization of Harm
The court’s holding rested on the decision that there had been no
materialization of harm from risk of earthquake damage to Property Owners’
property.122 The court recognized the risk of harm was present but equated it
to “any other risk,” drawing upon the rationale of harms from the
“vicissitudes of life.”123 The court concluded that since the Property Owners’
had not sustained physical damage from the earthquakes, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court would not allow for recoup for the insurance premiums.124 In
a final note, the court nixed the possibility of recovery under economic
duress, citing Oklahoma precedent not allowing for economic duress as an
independent tort.125
V. Analysis
Based on the general trend of authority toward recovery of insurance
premiums and Oklahoma’s treatment of oil and gas liability, the Meier
court’s decision makes judicial sense and was likely appropriately decided
based how the Oklahoma Supreme Court would analyze the matter. The court
rested heavily on the undisputed fact that the Property Owners had not felt
any physical damage. The only alleged damage was in the form of insurance
premiums and of an alleged increase in said insurance premiums due to
Operators’ activity. The court relied heavily on this distinction for their
conclusion.
The court compared the alleged injuries sustained by the Property Owners
to that of the general harms and risks of life. The court’s decision ultimately
rested on the inability to properly assign damages in an instance where there
had been no solid or tangible manifestation of the proposed harm—personal
or property injury. In consideration of general tort law, this rationale is
natural.
Tort law refuses to allow recovery in instances where there are intervening
or superseding causes in the chain of events harming the plaintiff.126 Where
there is uncertainty in causation, it is generally inappropriate to assign all
liability of proximate cause to a party. The court’s rationale here was parallel
with these general tort concepts—as a policy matter, precluding recovery
where the causal chain of events and harm cannot be established. Here, the
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Stout v. Rutherford, 1959 OK 128, ¶ 6, 341 P.2d 266, 269.
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courts focused on the risks from the “vicissitudes of life” as causing
uncertainty where there was no materialization of the harm, a very natural
interpretation in the context of Oklahoma tort law.
A. Negligence and Policy Considerations
By relying on the Severn Place decision, the Meier court inadvertently
adopted the policy of the Louisiana appellate court.127 The Louisiana court
adopted language from a precedent case and opined that when determining
the duty of a party in a negligence case, the question as to what falls within
the scope of duty is ultimately a policy question.128 The court adopted a strict
view for analyzing when third parties might be liable to policyholders for
increased insurance paid to an insurer because allowing same would “open[]
the door to remote damages that are better precluded as a matter of public
policy.”129
The court explained that allowing such recovery would leave the door for
recovery too open with “no sensible or just stopping point.”130 The court was
concerned with the proportionality of defendants’ responsibility to the
alleged injury.131 The court noted that several other states had taken a similar
view, not allowing for recovery of insurance premiums for negligence.132
As a policy matter and in consideration of Oklahoma tort law, this policy
conclusion is appropriately translatable to the Oklahoma case. Where there
is uncertainty and concern in assigning liability for damages without direct
causation and harm and a general concern about assigning insurance
premium costs to third parties, it would make no judicial sense to require an
alleged party to account for the alleged harm where there is a general dislike
for assigning insurance premiums, a missing link in causation, and no
materialization of harm.
B. Mechanisms for Recovery in Oil & Gas Litigation
Operators of oil and gas ventures are often held liable for their misconduct
and oversight through breach of contract, common law, or statutory
mechanisms. Damages to property in Oklahoma, are often recovered based

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

930 So.2d 125 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2006); Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1216–17.
Severn Place, 930 So.2d at 127.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 128–129.
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off of the Reasonable Use Doctrine133 for post-drilling activities or the
Surface Damage Act for drilling activities.134 The premise for these
mechanisms, however, generally only provides relief for the landowners for
which the operations are occurring on and are only for damages at the
operation site—not for damage done off of the actual site.135 For landowners
like the Property Owners in Meier v. Chesapeake Operating, this gap in
Oklahoma Law leaves such landowners susceptible to damage that is
unprovable and unrecoverable.
C. Res Ipsa Loquitur Possibilities
Going forward, a doctrine that might eventually provide some answers or
ability to compensate based on scientific study and OCC regulation, is Res
Ipsa Loquitur.136 The Res Ipsa Doctrine provides a way to prove negligence
by using an inference or a rebuttable presumption of negligent activity. 137
The Doctrine requires proof by the landowner that (1) the instrumentality that
caused injury was in the operator’s exclusive control, (2) the type of damage
incurred does not happen but for negligence, (3) there are no other potential
causes of the damage, and (4) the operator was not in a position to know
about the potential damage.138
For this doctrine to ever be appropriate or help landowners like the
Property Owners in Meier v. Chesapeake Operating, there would have to be
a consensus of science and regulators that induced seismicity does not occur
but for negligence. Though it might be argued that drilling too deeply into
basement rock when drilling or reworking injection wells is negligent, it does
133. See Briscoe, Inc. v. Peters, 1954 OK 107, 269 P.2d 787 and Gulf Refining Co. v.
Davis, 80 So. 2d 467 (Miss.1955).
134. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 318 (2018).
135. See Briscoe, 269 P.2d at 790 (quoting Pure Oil Co. v. Gear, 1938 OK 511, 83 P.2d
389, 390) (“Under the ordinary oil and gas lease, the lessee in developing the premises in the
production of oil and gas, is entitled to the possession and use of all that part of the leased
premises reasonably necessary in producing and saving the oil and gas, including space to
construct tanks and ponds, in which to confine salt water and other waste matter coming from
the wells, and also including the space necessary to transport such waste matter from the wells
into such tanks or ponds in a reasonably prudent manner.”) (emphasis added).
136. See Norman v. Greenland Drilling Co., 1965 OK 77, ¶ 16, 403 P.2d 507, 510 (quoting
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Colvert, Okl., 1953 OK 193, 260 P.2d 1076) (“Where the
instrumentality or thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management and control
of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from the want of care.”).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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not appear, overall, that there is enough scientific support and consensus to
support this as a legal concept, enough to assign negligence liability or meet
the required standards of proof.139 It appears as though the industry needs
more scientific research and trial and error to really be able to appropriately
assign liability based on the “but for” prong.
As previously discussed, landowners face evidentiary issues in the
assignment of liability against operators.140 Such an obstacle would have to
be overcome for a successful Res Ipsa Negligence claim as well. The
damaging instrumentality has to be in the exclusive control of the operator in
order to establish Res Ipsa liability.141
Again, there is likely not enough science or consensus to support liability
in the current state of the industry. The evidentiary issues stem from a need
for experts to have the ability to pinpoint the area and operator who
specifically induced seismicity.142 Also, considering the dramatic change in
regulatory schemes dealing with oil and gas operations over the last 50 years,
it is hard to regulate and assign liability where many wells were drilled or
commissioned in a different regulatory era. However, with the OCC’s recent
UIC initiatives it seems as though operators are being held to a higher
standard in Oklahoma with what wells they may use and to what depths they
may drill new wells.143
Further, proving a lack of other potential causes for the damages would be
difficult and require considerable expert-input. Particularly, in the Meier v.
Chesapeake Operating case, Property Owners would be charged with the
obstacle of proving that there were no other driving forces behind the
increase in earthquake premiums. Any such proof would require expert
analysis and testimony from a variety of industries and still might not be
accepted.144
There is the overall question of whether, as a matter of policy considering
Oklahoma’s economic dependence on oil and gas operations, it would be a
prudent adaptation of law to allow presumptive negligence to attach to
induced seismicity. The Meier v. Chesapeake Operating court made similar
policy considerations in their discussion of the “vicissitudes of life.”145
Perhaps, as a matter of policy, it is better that such fleeting instances of
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See Wu, supra note 32.
Ehrman, supra note 17, at 645-46.
See supra text accompanying note 136.
See supra note 68.
STATE IMPACT: OKLAHOMA, supra note 29.
See supra note 68.
Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1219.
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damage to landowners with such abstract causes and fault are considered part
of the risk of living in Oklahoma and benefitting from the oil-rich economy.
However, in considering the interests of similarly situated landowners
experiencing economic loss from such activities, it is a theory that must at
least be considered.
D. Denial of Economic Duress
The Meier v. Chesapeake Operating court ruled out economic duress as a
basis for recovery for the Property Owners.146 The court explained that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court had ruled out the theory as an independent basis
of tort recovery.147 Based on the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruling, the theory
may only be advanced as an “equitable doctrine in contract law.”148
Economic duress would make for an interesting mechanism for recovery,
in theory, for landowners like the Property Owners in Meier v. Chesapeake
Operating. The elements to prove economic duress under intentional tort law
include: (1) a contract that results from a wrongful or unlawful act by
coercing party who knew of the coercive impact and acted intentionally to
coerce, (2) there is no reasonable alternative for the coerced party to the
contract, and (3) the coerced party was detrimentally affected by the
coercion.149 The concept of indemnity and assignment of liability would
likely pose a problem for recovery under this theory as the elements would
be established against the insurance company for which the contract was
made with—not the oil and gas operators.150
E. Denial of Constitutional and Statutory Arguments
The Meier v. Chesapeake Operating court also rejected the Property
Owners’ theories of recovery based on Article 2 of the Oklahoma
Constitution151 and Oklahoma Statute.152 The court reasoned, specifically,
that Section 6 of Article 2 does not guarantee a plaintiff a specific remedy in
146. Id.
147. Id.; Cimarron Pipeline Constr., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 1993 OK 22, ¶
10, 848 P.2d 1161.
148. Cimarron Pipeline Constr., Inc., 848 P.2d at 1162.
149. Centric Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 1986 OK 83, ¶ 14, 731 P.2d 411, 417.
150. See Braden v. Hendricks, 1985 OK 14, ¶ 11, 695 P.2d 1343, 1349 (“While
Oklahoma's jurisprudence does not have a statutorily unrestricted right of contribution among
joint tortfeasors, it does recognize a right of indemnity when one—who was
only constructively liable to the injured party and was in no manner responsible for the harm—
is compelled to pay damages because of the tortious act by another.”).
151. See supra notes 111, 115.
152. See supra notes 112–114.
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a case but instead is intended to guarantee the judicial branch be “open and
available for resolution of disputes.”153
This conclusion by the federal court aligns well with rulings from the
Oklahoma Supreme Court. In Anadarko v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge,
118 the Oklahoma Supreme Court specifically explained that “Section 6 is
most often used to insure equal access to court, regardless of status.”154
Therefore, it would have been inappropriate for the District Court to have
afforded relief to the Property Owners based on the theory that the Article
warranted the specific recovery of insurance premiums.
Further, the court considered Property Owners’ contention that Oklahoma
Statutes Title 23 Sections 3 and 61 required recovery of insurance
premiums.155 However, the court explained the sections were mere
codification of common law and there was no precedence for allowing recoup
of insurance premiums based on the statutes.156 Again, this is a clear
distinction of Oklahoma law where the District Court had only one
appropriate way to rule.
F. Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC et al.
The Western District Court faced a similar case involving induced
seismicity in 2017. In Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, an
environmental organization brought suit against similar operators under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act157 for declaratory and injunctive
relief.158 The environmental organization alleged an increase in seismic
activity due to operators’ deep injection of waste.159 The environmental
organization sought to have the operators reduce the amount of waste being
injected to fix any structures that might be vulnerable if there were to be a
large seismic activity and to engineer a monitoring mechanism for predicting
unsafe injection levels.160 The operators contended that the court should
abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Burford abstention doctrine.161
The Burford abstention doctrine advises that:

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d 1207, 1218 (quotation omitted).
1997 OK 14, ¶ 6, 934 P.2d 328 (quotations omitted).
See supra notes 112–114.
Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1218–19.
42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(27) et seq. (West 2018).
248 F.Supp.3d 1194 (W.D. Okla. 2017).
Sierra, 248 F.Supp.3d 1194.
Id.
Id. at 1199.
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Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a
federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the
proceedings or orders of the state administrative agencies: (1)
when there are difficult questions of law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case then at bar; or (2) where the
exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar
cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent
policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.162
The court agreed with the operators that dismissal was appropriate under the
Burford abstention doctrine.163
Though the court recognized the importance and severity of induced
seismicity, it opined that the OCC had “. . . . responded energetically . . . .”
to the challenge of regulatory activity concerning earthquakes.164 The court
also explained that the OCC was technically better prepared to respond to
and investigate the concerns of the environmental organization and others
similarly situated.165 This case, like Meier v. Chesapeake Operating, did not
allow the district court to advance far on the development of law in the area.
The framing of the cases along with the procedural implications kept the
courts from having the ability to advance the legal framework.
G. Decision Impact
The court’s decision in Meier v. Chesapeake Operating will likely have
several important impacts on future oil and gas litigation. First, the decision
solidifies the state’s favorability of and commitment to the oil and gas
industry. Though the court did not exercise judicial overreach and did an
admirable job of predicting how the Oklahoma Supreme Court would rule, it
potentially could have fashioned a holding, using judicial overreach, to
promote the attachment of new liability to oil and gas operators.
Second, since the decision was based centrally on insurance law and not
oil and gas principles, it leaves room for future litigation to define the
contours of the law surrounding claims similar to Property Owners’. For
example, had Property Owners brought a claim supporting and citing cases
where operators had been held liable for similar alleged damages under oil
and gas principles, an Oklahoma court would have the opportunity to provide
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 1202–1203.
Id.
Sierra, 248 F.Supp.3d at 1209.
Id.
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instruction for an exact framework for the erroneously named “frackquake”
cases.
Meier v. Chesapeake Operating managed to sidestep having to make any
guesses as to what the Oklahoma Supreme Court would want the framework
to be based off the way Property Owner’s attorneys framed the issue, using
cases that were insurance and contract oriented. This move by Property
Owner’s council was likely a strategic approach, considering the state’s
overall favorability to the industry.
Third, the decision will likely prompt prudent insurance carriers to
consider the reengineering of insurance policies in terms of earthquake
liability. If disturbance of basement rock is going to cause some induced
seismicity—however minute—and disturbance of basement rock is going to
be a reality, to some extent, in a natural-resource-active state, competitive
insurers will want to provide their clients with a competitive advantage in
coverage. They will also want to be prepared to protect themselves from
future litigation of the Meier v. Chesapeake Operating tune that might, under
different circumstances, find insurers liable for more than they bargained for.
Furthermore, the decision will likely prompt prudent oil and gas
companies of all trades to consider their liability for seismic activity. Being
proactive as a company, in terms of foreseeing potential liabilities, is an
important function essential to survival. Considering the rise in litigation
similar to Meier v. Chesapeake Operating, diligence would suggest the legal
teams in any such companies should consider how they can be proactive to
manage future risk, in the contracts and protocols they are implementing
now. It would also be prudent for these companies to consider their policies
surrounding environmental proactivity in terms of seismicity and injection
wells. Though the OCC imposes certain regulations, companies might
consider going above and beyond the regulations to maintain favor with
Oklahoma constituents.
Undoubtedly, the beginning of this type of litigation in Oklahoma will
likely reinforce the Oklahoma Corporation Commission’s dedication to
regulating injection activities to prevent unnecessary disturbance of
basement rock. The OCC has already shown dedication to regulating any
activity that might cause induced seismicity, however, as individuals begin
to look for ways to recover against oil and gas operators for said seismicity,
the OCC will have to remain diligent in its pursuant of balanced regulation
of the oil and gas industry.
Finally, the Oklahoma decision could potentially influence other states’
treatment of similar cases. Though the court in Meier v. Chesapeake
Operating sidestepped some oil and gas decision-making, its overall
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disposition and treatment of the case could influence other oil-and-gasfriendly states in favor of operators.
As a final thought, it would be interesting to see how liable operators could
be held for negligently disturbing basement rock. If the disturbance of
basement rock is the main cause of induced seismicity and the OCC is
working to regulate injection well depths and quality, could there not be
liability found where a company negligently—without conforming to the
industry-accepted duty—drilled too deeply into or disturbed basement rock?
Operators spend a large amount of money and time on diagnostic tests to
promote efficiency in production and operation.
If similar resources were committed to the quality of injection wells and
investigatory resources, possibly through the Oklahoma Geological Survey
and OCC, maybe negligence could be a cause of action for disturbance of
basement rock. For this to ever be a possibility, more consensus must be
reached on the cause of induced seismicity, the appropriate legal standards
for measuring such negligence must be established, and technology overall
needs to be more prepared to cater to such investigatory needs.
VI. Conclusion
It is easy to see why Oklahoma state courts tend to give oil and gas
companies the benefit of the doubt when possible. Oklahoma’s historical and
continued reliance on the industry makes for important policy concerns when
courts have to consider liabilities be imposed on such companies. The
imposition of certain liabilities without significant scientific and technical
support is not realistic for a state that relies on and generally supports the oil
and gas industry.
Such notions are expounded when applied to the concept of induced
seismicity. Without the technology and legal and scientific consensus to be
able to fairly and accurately pinpoint liability, there can be no arbitrary
liability placed in a state that relies on the industry so heavily. Though the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission has shown an admirable commitment to
regulating activity that might induce seismic activity, it is a campaign that
will have to continue and evolve as science and technology do.
Cases like Meier v. Chesapeake Operating provide for an interesting
cross-section of oil and gas law principles, contract, tort, and insurance law.
The way the case was presented and framed for the court did not allow them
much leeway in developing new landscape law for the oil and gas industry
but still imposes important implications. It will be enthralling to see how
other courts within the state handle induced seismicity issues going forward.
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